On the evolution of Religion in Europe: a case law study on new religions, ancient spirituality and unexpected philosophies (Part II)

by Giovanni Morselli

Geographical collocation
Bibliography: INFORM; Guide on Article 9 of the Convention – Freedom of thought, conscience and religion, page 10; aeterius.org; uk.churchofjesuschrist.org and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. the United Kingdom; emin.org; findhorn.org; jesus.org.uk; https://schoolofphilosophy.org/; ain23.com/topy.net/; https://www.raelfrance.fr/ and F.L. v. France; aumisme.org/en/ and Association des Chevaliers du Lotus d’Or v. France; alliance-universelle.org; anandagaorii.dk; https://www.jw.org and Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria; damanhur.org; Athame Magazine; shriaghoreshwar.org; chiesapastafariana.it; ras-tafari.com; www.templarioggi.it; https://dragonrouge.se; livetsord.se; web.archive.org/web/20161007014151/http://www.louserfenis.nl/; santodaime.org and Fränklin-Beentjes and CELU-Luz da Floresta v. the Netherlands; Leela Förderkreis e. V. and Others v. Germany; vissarion.ru; Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia; Nolan and K. v. Russia; newchurch.org; thegreatwhithebrotherhood.org; familyfed.org and Boychev and Others v. Bulgaria); A.O. Falun Dafa and Others v. Moldova; Mockuté v. Lithuania; romuva.lt and Ancient Baltic religious association “Romuva” v. Lithuania; www.asatru.is and Ásatrúarfélagið v. Iceland; pewforum.org.
Most european Countries show the presence of newly established religious movements. Only some of these movements are indigenous to Europe, many come from the United States – such as the Family, or the Way International – or Asia (mainly India), take for example the Aghori movement or the Rajneesh movement (although the Aghori movement is a very ancient practice, the West has just met it, and in Italy there is one of the few shrines). Japan and Korea grew some relevant movements, take the Tenrikyo and The Unification Church. The Caribbean gave space to the Rastafarianism. African movements such as Vodun, Cherubim and Seraphim, or the Brotherhood of the Cross and Star, arrived in Europe. Research made by INFORM, in Britain, has shown that between 1984 and 2004 there were more than 800 new movements, and today is estimated that they have at least triplicated: as such it’s impossible to create a list of all these movements, also due to the fact that some groups are closed to the public and do not advertise their existence. Nonetheless, it’s possible to show some relevant cases regarding such movements – using information given by the Guide on Article 9 – in conjunction with their geographic collocation, and it’s possible to show how they impacted the European Court of Human Rights. Here we can see that there are a variety of movements for every area analyzed, including also “various coherent and sincerely-held philosophical convictions” (definition given by Guide on Article 9 of the Convention – Freedom of thought, conscience and religion, page 10).
Britain:
Aetherius Society (see aeterius.org);
Mormonism (see uk.churchofjesuschrist.org) (an important case is The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. the United Kingdom);
Emin Foundation (see emin.org);
Exegesis;
Findhorn Foundation (see findhorn.org);
The Jesus Army (see jesus.org.uk);
The Process;
The School of Philosophy and Economic Science (see https://schoolofphilosophy.org/);
Thee Temple Ov Psychick Youth (see ain23.com/topy.net/);
Various esoteric orders associated with Aleister Crowley (1875-1947) and Gerald Gardener (1884- 1964).
France:
The Raëlians (see https://www.raelfrance.fr/) (a relevant case was F.L. v. France);
Aumism of Mandarom (see aumisme.org/en/) (a relevant case is: Association des Chevaliers du Lotus d’Or v. France);
Roux’s L’église Chrétienne Universelle (see alliance-universelle.org).
Denmark: Ananda Ashram (see anandagaorii.dk).
Austria: Jehovah’s Witnesses (see https://www.jw.org) (for a case law reference see Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria).
Italy:
Damanhur (see damanhur.org);
Several Wicca covens (the Athame Magazine is linked with information regarding Wicca covens in Italy);
Aghori (see shriaghoreshwar.org);
Various forms of Satanism;
African Vodun;
Pastafarianism (see chiesapastafariana.it);
Rastafarianism (see ras-tafari.com);
Various Mason orders;
Templar movements (see www.templarioggi.it).
Sweden:
Dragon Rouge (see https://dragonrouge.se);
Elf related beliefs;
Livets Ord (see livetsord.se).
Netherlands:
Lou Movement (see web.archive.org/web/20161007014151/http://www.louserfenis.nl/);
The Santo Daime religion (see santodaime.org) (Fränklin-Beentjes and CELU-Luz da Floresta v. the Netherlands).
Germany: Osho movement (Leela Förderkreis e. V. and Others v. Germany).
Spain: Al-Murabitun.
Russia:
Vissarion’s Church of the last testament (see vissarion.ru);
Jehovah’s Witnesses (Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia);
The Reverend Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church (Nolan and K. v. Russia).
Romania: The New Jerusalem (see newchurch.org).
Ukraine: Khristos’ White Brotherhood (see thegreatwhithebrotherhood.org).
Bulgaria:
Duenov’s Brotherhood of Light;
The Reverend Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church (see familyfed.org) (case law: Boychev and Others v. Bulgaria).
Moldova: Falun Gong (A.O. Falun Dafa and Others v. Moldova).
Lithuania:
Osho movement (case: Mockuté v. Lithuania);
Neo-Paganism (see romuva.lt, for a case law reference see Ancient Baltic religious association “Romuva” v. Lithuania).
Iceland: Neo-Paganism (see www.asatru.is, a case law reference is Ásatrúarfélagið v. Iceland).

If we look at the data provided by Pew Research Center on the religious composition by Country and population, it’s possible to see the percentage of unaffiliated people, folk religion practitioners and those who identify as “other”. The data shown underneath excludes Christians, Jews, Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims, id est millenary religions [which are not, by their nature, new religions, ancient spiritualities or unexpected philosophies, and for the data regarding those religions see Religious Composition by Country, 2010-2050, Pew Research Center (pewforum.org)]. Even if it is impossible, right now, to identify the statistics of every New Movement, it is possible to look at the numbers of those who do not identify or relate to mainstream religions, id est those who are labelled “Unaffiliated”, “Folk Religion” or “Other” in the research made by the Pew Research Center.

State	Unaffiliated	Folk Religions	Other
Netherlands	42.1%	0.2%	0.2%
Belgium	31%	0.2%	0.1%
Luxemburg	26.7%	< 0.1%	0.3%
Denmark	12%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
France	31.9%	0.4%	0.2%
Norway	11.6%	0.1%	0.2%
Sweden	29%	0.3%	0.2%
United Kingdom	31.2%	0.1%	0.8%
Ireland	7.9%	0.2%	< 0.1%
Italy	13.4%	0.2%	< 0.1%
Greece	6.1%	0.1%	< 0.1%
Iceland	3.9%	0.5%	0.2%
Turkey	1.2%	< 0.1%	0.2%
Germany	26.3%	< 0.1%	0.1%
Austria	14.5%	0.1%	0.1%
Cyprus	1.9%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Switzerland	22.8%	< 0.1%	0.2%
Malta	2.5%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Portugal	8.6%	0.2%	< 0.1%
Spain	21%	0.1%	< 0.1%
Liechtenstein	2.9%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
San Marino	7.2%	< 0.1%	0.9%
Finland	20.8%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Hungary	20.3%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Poland	7.3%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Bulgaria	4.7%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Estonia	60.2%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Lithuania	9.8%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Slovenia	18.8%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Czech Republic	78.4%	0.2%	< 0.1%
Slovakia	15.8%	0.1%	< 0.1%
Romania	0.1%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Andorra	8.8%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Latvia	45.3%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Moldova	1.3%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Albania	1%	< 0.1%	0.2%
Ukraine	12.5%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
North Macedonia	1.3%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Russia	15.2%	0.2%	< 0.1%
Croatia	5.1%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Georgia	0.7%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Armenia	1.3%	< 0.1%	0.1%
Azerbaijan	< 0.1%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4.7%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Serbia	3.3%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Monaco	11.7%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%
Montenegro	3.1%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%

Case law study: some new movements and related cases – section 1
Bibliography: Encyclopedia Britannica; definition given by John Halstead in neo-paganism.org; Application no. 22897/08 Ásatrúarfélagid against Iceland; Article 9 of the Convention (taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14); Sections 2 and 3 of the Act on Parish Charges, etc. No. 91/1987; Section 1 of Act No. 78/1997; Articles 62, 63 and 64 of the Constitution of Iceland, section 1 of Act No. 108/1999; Leela Förderkreis e. V. and Others v. Germany, no. 58911/00; Darby v. Sweden; Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention; Idinopulos, Thomas A.; Yonan, Edward A. (1996), The sacred and its scholars: comparative methodologies for the study of primary religious data; Abhay Vaidya, “Oshoites amused by American terrorism tag”, The Times of India; see FitzGerald 1986, p. 108; Aveling 1999, p. xxii; Basic Law involved are article 2 co. 2 first sentence, article 4 co. 1 and co.2, article 6 co. 1, article 65; Judgments and Decisions of the Federal Administrative Court, vol. 96, pp 82 et seq.; article 6 § 1 of the Convention; König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A no. 27, §§ 88-89, and Maaouia v. France (dec.), no. 39652/98, ECHR 1999-II; Süßmann v. Germany, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 1174, §§ 55-57; see Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], no. 27417/95, § 72, ECHR 2000-VII; Kalaç v. Turkey, judgment of 1 July 1997, Reports 1997-IV, p. 1209, § 27; Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, § 64, ECHR 2004-I; De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12, p. 45, § 93; The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 30, § 47, and Casado Coca v. Spain, judgment of 24 February 1994, Series A no. 285-A, p. 18, § 43; , Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, § 49, ECHR 2002-I; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, § 103, ECHR 2003-II; Article 14 of the Convention; Article 41 of the Convention; Sürmeli v. Germany [GC], no. 75529/01, § 148, ECHR 2006.
It would be impossible to show all the New Movements, in a practical way, because it is impossible to determine how many there are. Because of this, I will show some of the most discussed or controversial ones, with case law references (verba volant, scripta manent said the Latins, and no scripta is better than the ECHR case law when religious freedom is at stake). Before the description of the case, I will provide an introduction to the new movement involved, hopefully creating some contextual clarity. References to case law will be taken directly by the documents of the sentences.
Neo-Paganism (Iceland): what type of neo-paganism?
Following the definition given by Encyclopedia Britannica, Neo-Paganism is a group of “spiritual movements that attempt to revive the ancient polytheistic religions of Europe and the Middle East”. This means that there are multiple possibilities when someone refers to Neo-Paganism and related activities and/or practices. These movements can be described as a revival of pagan religions that nowadays involve more and more people. John Halstead describes this religious movement “the central characteristics of which are a perception of divinity as immanent, a multiplicity of deities, both feminine and masculine, a commitment to environmental responsibility and a creative approach to ritual” (neo-paganism.org). On neo-paganism.org it’s possible to read that this movement differs from other pagan movements of the contemporary times because it is not reconstructionist, not related to Wicca, exoteric and not esoteric (it has no ceremonial magic), not devotional toward any deity. Regarding the ECHR, a case involving Neo-Paganism can be found in Iceland.
APPLICATION NO. 22897/08 ÁSATRÚARFÉLAGID AGAINST ICELAND
The facts.
The applicant, Ásatrúarfélagið, is a religious association which was established in 1972 and registered in 1973. Its seat is in Reykjavík, Iceland. The applicant association was represented before the Court by Mr. Ragnar Aðalsteinsson, a lawyer practising in Reykjavík. The stated purpose of the applicant association was, among other things, to honour the ways of the old Nordic Gods. According to Article 63 of the Icelandic Constitution and section 1 of the Act on Registered Religious Associations, all persons had the right to form religious associations and to practise their religion in conformity with their individual convictions. According to Article 62 of the Icelandic Constitution, the Evangelical Lutheran Church was the National Church of Iceland, and the State was to protect and support it as such. In 2007 it had 252,461 members, which amounted to 81% of the population. In accordance with the relevant legislation, the State collects, through the general tax system, a fixed amount, the so-called parish charge, from every person aged sixteen or older and allocates the funds so collected to the religious organization to which he or she belongs (sections 2 and 3 of the Act on Parish Charges, etc. No. 91/1987). Accordingly, the applicant association receives this amount for each of its members sixteen years of age and older. The same applies to the National Church and every other registered religious organization. Moreover, the State allocates from the State budget specific funding to the National Church. This includes a contribution to the Church Affairs Fund and to the Parish Equalization Fund, the level of which represents respectively 11.3 and 18.5 per cent of the amounts of parish charges collected from the members in accordance with the above system. These payments are derived from income taxes and are distributed in this manner in accordance with statutory law, i.e., the abovementioned Act on Parish Charges etc. and the Act on the Church Affairs Fund No. 138/1993. The Parish Equalization Fund was solely intended for the parishes of the National Church and the role of the fund, according to section 6 of the Act on Parish Charges etc., was to provide grants to the churches within the National Church which had a special status, to attempt to even the position among the parishes and to strengthen the position of those where the parish charges were insufficient to cover necessary expenses.
Administrative and judicial proceedings initiated by the applicant association.
On 19 October 1998 the applicant association submitted a request to the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs for recognition of its right to receive a similar contribution from the State, i.e., an amount equivalent to 29.8% of the parish charges. On 17 November 2003 it again submitted a request to the Ministry, this time for the payment of the equivalent of the two disputed contributions for the year 2002. Both requests were rejected by the Ministry in letters of 20 November 1998 and 15 January 2004, respectively. On 12 January 2006 the applicant association lodged proceedings before the Reykjavík District Court against the State requesting the payment of ISK 1.074.242, a sum which amounted to 29.8% of the parish charges which the applicant association had received in the year 2002. In its judgment, delivered on 28 November 2006 (not submitted to the Court), the District Court made a distinction between the Church Affairs Fund and the Parish Equalization Fund. It noted that the Church Affairs Fund was meant to fund statutory tasks assigned to the National Church. No such tasks were assigned to the applicant association. The situation of the applicant association and the National Church was therefore different in this respect. The same was not found to apply in regard to the Parish Equalization Fund the role of which was, among other things, to attempt to even out the position between certain parishes and facilitate the establishment of new parishes. The District Court found that the allocation of this supplementary funding to the National Church and not to the applicant association could, to a certain extent, be regarded as discriminatory. However, the District Court stated that it was not within its jurisdiction to adopt a judgment requiring the State to pay the disputed contributions to the applicant association; such decision was clearly for the legislator to take. Accordingly, it found in favour of the State and rejected the applicant association’s action.
The Supreme Court judgment of 25 October 2007.
The applicant association appealed to the Supreme Court of Iceland, which also found in favour of the State. The majority stated (translation submitted by the applicant association): “Section 1 of Act No. 78/1997 on the Position, Administration and Procedures of the State Church states that the State Church of Iceland is an independent religious association built on an Evangelical Lutheran foundation which the State government is required to support and protect. Admission to the Church is granted through christening and registration in the National Registry. On the issue of legal status, section 2 of the Act states that the State Church is independent of the State within the statutory limits, and section 3 states that the defendant shall pay to the State Church an annual contribution on the basis of agreements on Church assets and parsonages between the defendant and the State Church in addition to its other sources of revenue, statutory and otherwise. […]. In accordance with Articles 63 and 64 of the Constitution, section 1 of Act No. 108/1999 on Registered Religious Associations states that all persons have the right to form religious associations and practise their religion in accordance with their respective convictions.
[…] Chapter II contains provisions on registered religious associations outside the State Church.
[…] The appellant is a registered religious association pursuant to this Act. The Act contains no provisions which are equivalent to the provisions of the Act on the position, administration and procedures of the State Church, as described above, or other Acts pertaining to the State Church and its activities. The employees of the State Church are civil servants, with rights and obligations as such with regard to the general public, and not only with regard to members of their congregations. There is nothing in the law regarding such obligations of the employees of other religious associations.
[…] The fact that the appellant’s tasks and obligations to society cannot be compared to the statutory tasks and obligations of the State Church is in and of itself sufficient reason to determine that the legislature’s decision on allocations to the State Church from the State Treasury in excess of other religious associations does not constitute discrimination and hence does not violate the equality principle of Article 65 of the Constitution.” The minority of the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion but with different arguments. After discussing the relevant domestic and international law it concluded that the State was under no general obligation “to level the financial position of other religious associations with that enjoyed by the State Church as a result of Article 62 of the Constitution.”
Complaints.
The applicant association complained under Article 9 on its own and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention about the allocation of the additional funding equivalent to 29.8 % of the parish charges to the National Church but not to the applicant. The applicant association also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that a certain percentage of its members’ income tax had been allocated to the National Church (amounting to 29.8 % of the parish charges), a church to which they did not belong.
The Law.
Complaint under Article 9 of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14.
The applicant association’s submissions
The applicant association complained under Article 9 of the Convention on its own and in conjunction with Article 14 that the allocation of the supplementary funding amounting to 29.8 % of the parish charges to the National Church but not to the applicant constituted an interference with the applicant’s freedom of religion as it discriminated against it. It argued that the Icelandic State had violated its right to freedom of religion by upholding the legal provisions concerning the above-mentioned funding and that it was being subjected to unlawful discrimination. It stated that the significantly greater financial contributions to the National Church could only be explained by the difference in religion. The religion represented by the National Church was given greater weight than other religions, including the one practised by the members of the applicant association. The crucial issue was therefore whether the discrimination was permitted and justified in a democratic society. The applicant association believed it was not. It further argued that the limitation of its freedom of religion, inherent in the financial discrimination, although prescribed by law, did not pursue a legitimate aim. Its purpose was to reduce the possibility of religious associations other than the National Church to thrive.
Moreover, the limitation was not necessary in a democratic society, there being no public need for it. Furthermore, by providing the registered religious associations with parish charges the Icelandic State was protecting its members’ freedom of religion. However, there should be no discrimination in such protection. The Icelandic State was violating the religious rights of the applicant association’s members by supplying additional funding, corresponding to 29.8% of the parish charges, to the National Church and thereby limiting proportionately the service offered by other religious organizations compared to the service available to the members of the National Church. Moreover, the applicant association rejected the finding of the Supreme Court that the statutory obligations imposed on the National Church differed from the obligations imposed on the applicant association or on other religious associations. In that context it stated that if statutory provisions exempted one party from being compared with others, the legislation could serve as a “veil of immunity” against the ban on discrimination enshrined in the Convention.
Assessment by the Court
At the outset the Court reiterates that a religious association may, as such, exercise on behalf of its members the rights guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention (see Leela Förderkreis e. V. and Others v. Germany, no. 58911/00). The application can therefore not be declared inadmissible under Article 34 of the Convention as being incompatible ratione personae. The Court reiterates, as held by the European Commission of Human Rights in Darby v. Sweden: “[a] State Church system cannot in itself be considered to violate Article 9 of the Convention. […] However, a State Church system must, in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 9, include specific safeguards for the individual’s freedom of religion. In particular, no one may be forced to enter, or be prohibited from leaving, a State Church.” […] Turning to the particular circumstances of the case, the Court notes that, like the National Church of Iceland, the applicant association, being a registered religious association, received the so-called parish charges which the Icelandic State collected from each of its members who had reached sixteen years of age. The level of funding derived from the said charges thus depended on the number of members. It further observes that, unlike the applicant association, the National Church received funding from the State, notably contributions to the Church Affairs Fund and to the Parish Equalisation Fund, representing altogether 29.8 % of the parish charges collected from the National Church’s members. The question raised by the present application is whether the fact that the National Church received such funding from the State budget, whilst the applicant association did not, was incompatible with Article 9 of the Convention taken on its own or together with Article 14. The Court will first consider whether the allocation of the disputed additional funding to the National Church entailed an interference with the Article 9 rights of the members of the applicant association. In the first place, the Court notes that, according to Article 63 of the Icelandic Constitution and section 1 of the Act on Registered Religious Associations, every person has the right to form religious associations and to practise their religion in conformity with their individual convictions. Having been registered in accordance with the Act, the applicant association and its members enjoyed the rights and assumed the obligations that followed from the act of registration. Thus, the association received funding in the form of parish charges collected by the State from each of its members. In this connection, the Court cannot but note that, according to the applicant association “[b]y providing registered religious associations with parish charges, based on income tax of individual citizens, the State of Iceland is actively protecting the members’ rights to practise their religion.” It should also be observed that, in order to register in accordance with the Act, religious associations must appoint a representative who meets the general conditions for being a civil servant and is accountable as such for the execution of the functions assigned to him or her by law. Such a representative was authorized to perform ceremonies. Against this background the Court finds nothing to indicate that the authorities of the respondent State in any way hindered or limited the exercise of the rights of the applicant association and its members under paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Convention. Nor does the Court find, in light of the considerations above, that the matter complained of disclosed any failure on the part of the respondent State to comply with any positive obligations that it may have had under Article 9 (see Jakóbski v. Poland, no. 18429/06. The freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs under this Article does not confer on the applicant association or its members an entitlement to secure additional funding from the State budget. On the basis of the above considerations, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a breach of the applicant association and its members´ right to practise their religion. Accordingly, the Court considers that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. As to the alleged violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9, the Court further reiterates that in Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], (no. 27417/95), it held: “[…] that, according to the established case-law of the Convention institutions, Article 14 only complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by those provisions. There can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter.” […] It is questionable whether Article 14 is applicable in the present case. In any event, even assuming that it was and that the facts fall within the ambit of Article 9, the Court reiterates that a difference in treatment will only be discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification (see, for instance, Darby v. Sweden, 23 October 1990, § 31, Series A no. 187). The Court sees no cause for calling into question the Supreme Court’s view that the fact that the applicant association’s tasks and obligations to society could not be compared to those of the National Church was a sufficient reason to find that the allocation of additional funding to the National Church alone did not constitute discrimination. As held by the Supreme Court, the Act on Registered Religious Associations does not contain provisions equivalent to those pertaining to the National Church, as described in the Supreme Court judgment. Moreover, the employees of the State Church are civil servants who, unlike employees of other religious associations, have rights and obligations as such with respect to the general public, not only with respect to members of their congregations. The statutory obligations imposed on the National Church and its employees by the abovementioned Act cannot be compared to those imposed on the applicant association. Thus, in so far as there was a difference of treatment, the Court is satisfied that it pursued a legitimate aim and was objectively and reasonably justified. It follows that this part of the application too must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
Complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention reads: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of is possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The applicant’s submissions
The applicant association complained that the system of parish charges constituted a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of its members. It submitted that a certain sum was taken monthly from the income tax of each of its members, i.e., the so-called parish charge which was then allocated to the applicant association. An individual belonging to the National Church, however, benefitted from the additional 29.8% of the parish charge allocated to his church, providing him with a better service than was the case for members of other religious associations. This led to less money being allocated to other public services available to its members, who, at the same time, were not able to use the services of the National Church.
Assessment by the Court
Leaving aside the question whether the applicant association may exercise on behalf of its adherents the rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and claim to be a victim of a breach of that Article, the Court notes that it does not appear to have raised this complaint before the domestic courts. It has therefore failed to exhaust domestic remedies. It follows that this part of the application should be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. In any event, the Court finds that this complaint is in effect a mere restatement of the complaints already rejected. It follows that this part of the application too could be rejected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court by a majority Declares the application inadmissible.

Osho Movement (Germany)
The Rajneesh movement are people inspired by the Indian mystic Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh (1931–1990), also known as Osho, particularly initiated disciples who are referred to as “neo-sannyasins” (see Idinopulos, Thomas A.; Yonan, Edward A. (1996), The sacred and its scholars: comparative methodologies for the study of primary religious data). “Orange People” was a term used to refer to the Rajneesh members, because of their clothes. In India they have also been called Oshoites (see Abhay Vaidya, “Oshoites amused by American terrorism tag”, The Times of India) The movement has been controversial for many reasons, starting with the fact that Osho was hostile towards traditional moral values. An interesting fact was that Osho’s teachings were linked also to becoming rich, he himself had quite the collection of Rolls Royces. The movement’s community of the 1980s, called Rajneeshpuram, built in Oregon, caused many problems for its attempts to take over the nearby town of Antelope and later the county seat of The Dalles, also via illegal means. The most infamous one was the attempted assassination plot to murder U.S. Attorney Charles H. Turner (see FitzGerald 1986, p. 108) as part of the United States’s first recorded bio-terror attack (carried out by deploying the Salmonella bacteria). The Bhagwan, (Rajneesh), was deported from the United States in 1985 as part of his Alford plea deal following the convictions of his staff and right hand Ma Anand Sheela, who were found guilty of the attack. After his deportation, 21 Countries denied him entry (see Aveling 1999, p. xxii). This movement was more focused on practice than ideology or philosophy, it started to develop techniques aimed at helping individuals to choose their religious path towards a universal religiousness. In a very interesting way, this movement was not intended to create a new religion in itself. The movement was intended to be worldwide and carried on affirmation of life, joy and sexual liberty, science rather than dogma. A case involving the Osho movement can be fund regarding Germany. What is shown here is an extract, directly taken from the document of the case.
CASE OF LEELA FÖRDERKREIS E.V. AND OTHERS v. GERMANY (Application no. 58911/00)
The facts.

The circumstances of the case
The applicant associations are religious associations or meditation associations belonging to the Osho movement […] the applicant associations promote the teachings of Osho. […] The applicant associations run Osho meditation centres, organise seminars, celebrate religious events and carry out joint work projects. They also protect the religious rights of their members against discrimination. The applicant associations belong to a group of previously unknown religious communities which first surfaced in Germany in the 1960s. They were described as “sects”. […] The groups quickly became the subject of critical public debate. […] The focus of concern was the potential danger that these groups could pose to adolescents’ personal development and social relations. […] Since 1970 the Federal Government and the governments of the Länder have been confronted with these issues. […] The Federal Government launched a large-scale information and education campaign designed to increase public awareness and stimulate a critical discussion on the aims and activities of sects. […] State agencies have characterised the applicant associations as a “sect”, “youth sect”, “youth religion” and “psychosect”. The adjectives “destructive” and “pseudo-religious” have also been used […] and the accusation has been raised that their members are manipulated. […] In their reply of 10 October 1984 concerning the “economic activities of destructive youth religions and psycho-sects” the Government mainly used the terms “youth religion” and “psycho-sect”. […] The “group based around “Bhagwan (i.e. God) Shree Rajneesh” was presented as one of these groups, and was included as one of the “psycho-movements”. […] In the speech he gave on 8 December 1984 at a conference on the topic “New youth religions – Protecting the freedom of the individual” the Federal Minister of Youth, Family and Health used the terms “youth religion”, “youth sect”, “sect”, “destructive religious cults”, “pseudo salvation teachings” and “pseudo-religion”. […] On 1 October 1984 the applicant associations instituted legal proceedings before the Cologne Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht). They requested that the Government desist from issuing the above mentioned statements about the religious movement and the associations belonging to it, maintaining that such statements were incriminating. They essentially alleged that their freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed under Article 4 §§ 1 and 2 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) had been infringed. […] The various statements of the Government had breached the obligation of neutrality required by Article 4 of the Basic Law by discrediting the teachings of the movement. The expressions used were either actually defamatory or were meant to be, and there was no factual or legal basis which would justify using those terms. The applicant associations did not pursue any activities contrary to the basic rights of other persons, groups or organisations. The Government had misinterpreted the concepts of Osho’s teachings and thus interfered with the essential religious beliefs of their movement. By a judgment of 21 January 1986 the Cologne Administrative Court prohibited the Government from calling the Rajneesh movement in official statements a “youth religion”, “youth sect” or “psycho-sect”, from using the adjectives “destructive” and “pseudo-religious” and from alleging that members of the Rajneesh movement had been manipulated. The Administrative Court found that those terms evoked a negative connotation of the basic contents of the applicant associations’ religious beliefs and that the use of those terms infringed their religious freedom guaranteed by Article 4 § 1 of the Basic Law. It considered, however, that the use of the term “sect” as such had no negative impact on the applicant associations’ religious belief. […] On 28 April 1986 the Government appealed against that judgment. A hearing was held before the Administrative Court of Appeal of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia (Oberverwaltungsgericht für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen) on 22 May 1990. By a judgment of the same day the Administrative Court of Appeal quashed the impugned judgment and dismissed the applicant associations’ claim as a whole, as well as the appeals of two applicant associations who had contested the findings of the first-instance court as regards the use of the term “sect”. It did not allow an appeal on points of law. The Administrative Court of Appeal found that the contested statements interfered with the applicant associations’ basic rights guaranteed by Article 4 §§ 1 and 2 of the Basic Law. However, the right to religious freedom was not absolute. It was subject to limitations by other provisions of the Basic Law. Limitations and interferences by the State had to be accepted where important reasons of public interest required the protection of basic rights which were in conflict with the right to freedom of religion. Where a mere suspicion of a possible violation of these rights existed, relevant information and warnings were appropriate and necessary for their protection. Under Article 65 of the Basic Law, which vested governmental functions in the Government, taken together with the positive obligations under Article 2 § 2, first sentence, which guarantees the right to life and to inviolability of the person, and Article 6 of the Basic Law, which protects the rights of the family, the Government had the right to impart information. The views expressed by the Government were acceptable and respected the principle of proportionality. On 13 March 1991 the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) dismissed the applicant associations’ appeal against the decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal refusing leave to appeal. The court considered that the case had no fundamental importance. […] On 3 May 1991 the applicant associations filed a constitutional complaint against the above-mentioned court decisions. On 23 April 1992 the Federal Constitutional Court informed the applicant associations in reply to their letter of 10 April 1992 that it was not able to indicate when a decision would be given. On 13 January 1993 it wrote to the applicant associations that the case had been communicated to the Federal Government and the Land of North-Rhine-Westphalia. On 2 November 1993 the Federal Government submitted their observations, which were served on the applicant associations on 4 November 1993. On 21 September 1994 the applicant associations submitted their observations in reply. By letters of 8 March 1993, 6 August 1995, 8 July 1998 and 3 February 2000 the applicant associations enquired about the state of the proceedings. […] On 26 June 2002 the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal of the Land North RhineWestphalia of 22 May 1990 violated the applicant associations’ basic rights guaranteed by Article 4 §§ 1 and 2 of the Basic Law. It quashed the judgment insofar as the applicant associations’ claim had been dismissed in respect of the use of the expressions “destructive”, and “pseudo-religious”, and the allegation that they “manipulated their members” and referred that part of the complaint back to the Administrative Court of Appeal for a new decision. However, it found that the Government was authorised to characterise the applicant associations’ movement as a “sect”, “youth religion”, “youth sect” and “psycho-sect” and was allowed to provide the public with adequate information about it. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the right to freedom of religion or belief guaranteed by Article 4 §§ 1 and 2 of the Basic Law did not prevent the State from entering into a public and even critical discussion about the aims and activities of religious groups. The limitations on the freedom of religion were to be found in other basic rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Basic Law, such as the protection of human dignity, the right to life and physical integrity and the protection of marriage and the family. The power to manage State affairs derived directly from the Basic Law and authorised the Federal Government to provide information in all matters coming within the sphere of their overall State responsibility. Providing direct public information helped them to resolve conflicts within the State and society, to face challenges even if they occurred at short notice, to react quickly and adequately to the problems and concerns of citizens and assist them in finding guidance. This activity did not require an express legal provision since it did not constitute a direct interference with the applicant associations’ rights. It merely influenced the conduct of others vis-à-vis the applicant associations. Moreover, it was not possible to establish rules for the Government’s information-imparting role, given the wide variety of the subject matter dealt with and methods used. When acting in the exercise of their power to direct State affairs, the Federal Government were entitled to provide information to the public, even if basic rights were indirectly affected as a result. However, the State had to restrict itself to neutral terms and act with moderation in matters of religion or belief. Defamatory, discriminating or deceptive statements were prohibited. The Government also had to respect the separation of powers between the Federal State and the Länder. […] Furthermore, the Federal Government had to respect the principle of proportionality when imparting information. Statements affecting the very essence of the right guaranteed by Article 4 §§ 1 and 2 of the Basic Law had to be appropriate in relation to the cause for concern. As to the term “sect”, the Federal Constitutional Court found that the Government were not prohibited from using the term, which at the material time corresponded to the general understanding of new religious movements. Similarly, the use of the terms “youth religion” and “youth sect” described the prevailing situation at the material time and the term “psycho-sect” reflected the Osho movement’s meditation practices. These terms were employed without discriminatory differences of treatment in respect of these groups on grounds of their religion or belief. They complied with the obligation of the State to neutrality in matters of religious and philosophical beliefs and did not affect the very essence of the right guaranteed by Article 4 §§ 1 and 2 of the Basic Law. In contrast, the use of the terms “destructive” and “pseudo-religious”, and the allegation that members of the movement were manipulated, did not satisfy the requirements of constitutional law. […] No substantiated reasons had been advanced which could have justified the statements regarded as defamatory by the complainants, nor were any such reasons otherwise apparent. That decision was served on the applicant associations on 30 July 2002. On 8 November 2002 the Federal Government withdrew their appeal against the judgment of the Cologne Administrative Court of 31 January 1986 as the appeal was again pending before the Administrative Court of Appeal following the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 26 June 2002. On 27 December 2005 the applicant associations’ representative informed the Court that the fourth and fifth applicant associations, Dharmadeep Verein für ganzheitliches Leben e.V. and Osho Meditations Center Berlin e.V, wished to withdraw their application.
Relevant domestic Law and Practices
The relevant provisions of the Basic Law involved are article 2 co. 2 first sentence, article 4 co. 1 and co.2, article 6 co. 1, article 65. As far as it goes for relevant practices, there are some references. By a judgment of 23 May 1989 the Federal Administrative Court ruled that the German Federal Government was entitled to provide information and publish warnings by virtue of their constitutional responsibility to inform the public about new religious and ideological communities and “psycho-groups” (see Judgments and Decisions of the Federal Administrative Court, vol. 96, pp 82 et seq.). On 15 August 1989 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a bench of three judges, did not accept the constitutional complaint of the Maharishi Organisation (Transcendental Meditation) for adjudication, confirming that the Federal Government was entitled to provide information on new religious and ideological communities and “psychogroups” in compliance with its constitutional obligations, namely to express opinions and submit recommendations and warnings to the public within the limits of the proper execution of the powers granted by the Basic Law (1 BvR 881/89). In 1996 the Federal Diet (Deutscher Bundestag) charged an expert commission to prepare a report on “so-called sects and psycho-cults”. In its final report issued in June 1998 the Commission of Enquiry stated that negative sentiments were typically evoked when the term “sect” was used. However, only a small number of the movements characterised as “sects” were problematic. The Commission recommended that in official statements, information leaflets or legal texts the word “sect” not be employed in future.
The Law.
I. As regards the fourth and fifth applicant associations
On 27 December 2005 the fourth and fifth applicant associations, Dharmadeep Verein für ganzheitliches Leben e.V. and Osho Meditations Center Berlin e.V., informed the Court about their wish to withdraw their application. The Court notes that these applicant associations do not intend to pursue their application within the meaning of Article 37 of the Convention. […] The Court considers that the conditions of Article 37 § 1 (a) are fulfilled. Furthermore, the Court finds no special circumstances relating to respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require it to continue the examination of the application. Accordingly, the application should be struck out of the Court’s list of cases insofar as it relates to these two applicant associations.
II. Alleged violation of article 6 § 1 of the Convention
The remaining applicant associations complained that the length of the proceedings before the administrative courts and before the Federal Constitutional Court had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. […] The Government contested that argument.
Admissibility
The Government’s submissions
In the Government’s view, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was not applicable in the present case, as the dispute did not refer to “civil rights and obligations” within the meaning of that Article. According to the Government, the subject of the proceedings, namely the alleged violation of the applicant associations’ freedom of religion by certain governmental statements, did not concern the violation of asset rights, but of legal interests of a non-pecuniary nature. Neither did the result of the impugned proceedings constitute a necessary prerequisite for bringing an action for damages against the Government before the civil courts. The Government further maintained that the contested warnings issued by the Government had no direct effect on or substantive consequences for the applicant associations’ legal position under civil law. […] Any such consequences could not be considered as immediate. The mere fact that the warnings may possibly have had financial consequences for the applicant associations was not sufficient to bring the proceedings within the scope of Article 6 § 1. Neither could the applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention be derived from the Court’s case-law, according to which the right to a good reputation was a “civil right” within the meaning of that provision. Firstly, the applicant associations did not assert the right to a good reputation or to personal honour under domestic law before the domestic courts, but only their right to the freedom to profess and practise a religion undisturbed without state interference. Secondly, the right to protect good reputation and personal honour could only be accorded to individual persons, but not to groups of persons such as the applicant associations.
The remaining applicant associations’ submissions
The applicant associations contested those arguments. They considered that their right to freedom of religion had to be regarded as a “civil right” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. They pointed out that the right to choose and profess one’s religion was an original individual right which was not bestowed by the State. They further maintained that the Convention did not limit the applicability of Article 6 § 1 to rights of a pecuniary nature. The field of “civil rights” traditionally encompassed a number of non-pecuniary rights including those relating to religious questions, such as the right to religious education. Even assuming that the right to freedom of religion should not be generally accepted as a “civil right” within the meaning of the Convention, Article 6 was applicable to the specific circumstances of the present case. The impugned Government actions had been aimed at influencing citizens’ behaviour relating to the applicant associations’ religious groups. Furthermore, the impugned statements had had a direct effect on the applicant associations’ and their members’ honour and reputation and their possibility to publicly profess their religion. The applicant associations finally maintained that the proceedings before the administrative courts were a prerequisite for bringing an action for damages against the Government before the civil courts, as the administrative courts were better placed than the civil courts to examine the legality of governmental actions.
Assessment by the Court
The Court notes, firstly, that the Government have not denied the existence of a dispute within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. However, they maintained that the dispute in question did not concern the determination of the applicant associations’ civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court reiterates that, under its case-law, the concept of “civil rights and obligations” cannot be interpreted solely by reference to the domestic law of the respondent State. On several occasions, the Court has affirmed the principle that these concepts are “autonomous”, within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A no. 27, §§ 88-89, and Maaouia v. France (dec.), no. 39652/98, ECHR 1999-II). Accordingly, whether or not a right is to be regarded as “civil” must be determined in an autonomous way by reference to the substantive content and effects of the right – and not only its legal classification – under the domestic law of the State concerned (see König, cited above, § 89). The Court observes that the proceedings at issue concerned the question whether the remaining applicant associations could prevent the Government from using certain terms when publicly referring to their religious groups. According to the domestic courts’ case-law, such a right could be derived from the right to freedom of religion, as enshrined in Article 4 §§ 1 and 2 of the Basic Law. It remains to be determined whether this right could be regarded as a “civil” right within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. The Court considers that possible negative consequences for the applicant associations’ financial situation did not form the direct subject matter of the present proceedings. However, while the Court has found on many occasions that the pecuniary nature of an asserted right brought a dispute within the ambit of Article 6 § 1 (see, for example, Salesi v. Italy, judgment of 26 February 1993, Series A no. 257-E, § 19), […] this does not mean that disputes of a non-pecuniary nature necessarily fall outside the scope of that provision. In this context. […] The Court does not find it necessary to determine if the right to freedom of religion generally has to be considered as a “civil right” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, in particular its relation to the applicant associations’ good reputation, the Court considers that the dispute at issue concerned a “civil right” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly illfounded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
Merits
The period to be taken into consideration began on 1 October 1984, when the applicant associations instituted legal proceedings before the Cologne Administrative Court, and ended on 8 November 2002, when the Federal Government withdrew their appeal, which was pending before the Federal Court of Appeal following remittal.
The e Government’s submissions
The Government submitted that the length of the proceedings before the Cologne Administrative Court had been reasonable and that any delays which had occurred during the proceedings before the Administrative Court of Appeal had been primarily imputable to the applicant associations, who, on 22 January 1988, requested that the next date for a hearing not be set for another six months, then filed a substantial crossappeal on 3 October 1988, applied twice for a hearing to be postponed and submitted further, extensive written statements and pleadings. While conceding that the length of the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court was considerable, the Government considered that it was justified by the circumstances of this particular case. They pointed out that the subject matter had to be regarded as particularly complex, as the underlying question whether the Government was entitled to issue warnings had been the subject matter of a number of complaints lodged at that time. The Federal Constitutional Court grouped these cases and, following the leading decisions given by the full Chamber – including the decision in the present case – disposed of the remaining complaints by decisions given by panels of three judges. According to the Government, the complexity of the case was further demonstrated by the wide coverage of the topic both in legal literature and in the general media. The Government emphasised the Federal Constitutional Court’s special role as “guardian of the Constitution” as recognised by the Court in its previous case-law. They further stressed the unique political background of German reunification, which had occurred just one and a half years before the present complaint was lodged. By way of example, they presented a list of twelve decisions relating to reunification issues taken by the Federal Constitutional Court’s first Chamber between July 1991 and July 1997. Furthermore, that court had had to decide on a great number of other complaints of considerable political and social importance as they concerned a great number of citizens, which had been given priority. […] According to the Government, the applicant associations themselves had caused delays in the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court by submitting their comments to the Government’s submissions of 4 November 1992 only eleven months later, namely on 21 September 1993. Furthermore, they had submitted extensive written observations throughout the proceedings. As to what was at stake for the applicant associations, the Government considered that the level of alleged interference with their freedom of religion was comparatively low. It was further diminished by the fact that the Government, following the recommendations made in the final report of the expert commission on “so-called sects and psycho-cults” (see § 32, above) in 1998, refrained from using the terms under dispute in its information campaign.
The remaining applicant associations’ submissions
According to the applicant associations, the excessive length of the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court was a result of a structural deficiency. That court had been overburdened since as early as the late 1970s, as was established in the Court’s earlier case-law. As regarded the complexity of the subject matter, the applicant associations considered that it was complex, but not extraordinarily so. In any event, it was the Federal Constitutional Court’s task to decide on complex constitutional issues and this could not justify the excessive length of the proceedings. As regarded the applicant associations’ own conduct, they alleged that they had refrained from replying immediately to the Government’s submissions after a competent staff member of the Constitutional Court had informed them that the complaint would not be dealt with for years. Further submissions had been necessitated by new developments and could have been avoided if the court had processed the case in due time. The extent of these submissions had been justified by the complexity of the case.
Assessment by the Court
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant associations and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant associations in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). The Court observes that the parties agree that the subject matter of the present proceedings concerned constitutional issues of a certain legal complexity. The Court endorses this assessment. As to the applicant associations’ conduct, the Court takes note that the applicant associations have not contested having caused a certain delay in the proceedings before the Administrative Court of Appeal by requesting that court on 22 January 1988 not to schedule a hearing within the next six months and by requesting for hearings to be re-scheduled twice. As regards the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court, the Court observes that the Government have not contested the applicant associations’ submissions that they had refrained from replying immediately to the Government’s submissions as that court had informed them that the case would not be dealt with for years. There is, furthermore, no indication that the extent of the applicant associations’ submissions to the Federal Constitutional Court had been excessive, having regard to the complexity of the subject matter. It follows that the applicant associations’ conduct cannot be considered to have contributed to the length of the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court. […] Having regard to the applicant associations’ contribution to the length of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 61, above) and to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court still considers this length to be acceptable. As to the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court, which lasted approximately eleven years and three months, the Court observes that it has frequently held that Article 6 § 1 imposes on the Contracting States the duty to organise their judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet each of its requirements, including the obligation to hear cases within a reasonable time. Although this obligation also applies to a Constitutional Court, when so applied it cannot be construed in the same way as for an ordinary court. Its role as guardian of the Constitution makes it particularly necessary for a Constitutional Court to take into account on occasion considerations other than the mere chronological order in which cases are entered on the list, such as the nature of a case and its importance in political and social terms. Furthermore, while Article 6 requires that judicial proceedings be expeditious, it also lays emphasis on the more general principle of the proper administration of justice (see, among other authorities, Süßmann v. Germany, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 1174, §§ 55- 57). […] The Court observes that the length of the instant proceedings cannot be explained by the exceptional circumstances of German reunification taken alone, as not more than twelve major decisions quoted by the Government which had been issued by the first chamber of the Federal Constitutional Court between July 1991 and July 1997 concerned issues related to German reunification as such (see, mutatis mutandis, HesseAnger v. Germany, no. 45835/99, § 32, 6 February 2003) […] Neither can the overall length of the proceedings be justified by the fact that the Government grouped a number of cases concerning similar subject matters, as all these cases had been lodged within a short period of time and the applicant associations’ case served as one of the pilot cases on the subject matter. […] Summing up, the Court does not consider that the arguments put forward by the Government can justify the length of the proceedings in the instant case. It follows that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
III. Alleged violation of article 9 of the Convention
The applicant associations complained that the Government’s information campaign constituted an unjustified interference with their right to manifest their religion, as provided in Article 9 of the Convention. The Government contested that argument.
Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
Merits
The remaining applicant associations’ submissions
The applicant associations maintained that since 1978, by referring to their movement as a “youth sect”, “youth religion”, “sect” and “psycho-sect”, the Federal Government had infringed their duty of neutrality in religious matters. […] According to the applicant associations, the statements in issue had had a clearly negative connotation and had been made in a climate of interference and oppression by the State and the mainstream churches, and had effectively prevented them from exercising their right to freedom of religion. […] The Government’s warning and indoctrination campaign had had no legal basis. Neither of the constitutional norms quoted by the Government was sufficiently clear to allow the infringement of the applicant associations’ Convention rights. They considered that the principle of proportionality did not set sufficiently clear limits to the exercise of the Government’s discretionary power where interferences with the freedom of religion derived directly from other constitutional rights. […] The applicant associations further maintained that the interference with their Convention rights was not justified by any of the legitimate aims set out in Article 9 § 2 of the Convention.
The Government’s submissions
The Government accepted that the applicant associations could refer to their right of religious freedom under Article 9 § 1 of the Convention. They considered, however, that the statements under dispute did not interfere with this right, as they were neither aimed at restricting the applicant associations’ right to exercise their religion undisturbed nor did they directly bring about such an effect. […] Even assuming an interference with Article 9 § 1, the Government considered this to be justified under § 2 of that same Article, as the contested statements remained within the margin of appreciation accorded to the Contracting States, that is, they were in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society. […] The Government further submitted that the contested statements had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the health of their citizens and their rights and freedoms, especially human dignity, from the potential dangers which new religious communities could pose to these rights. As regarded the proportionality of the Government’s action, they pointed out that the contested statements had been made at a time when the public had expected the Government to explain their policy towards the new religious groups. Given the situation at the time, the Government had been justified in suspecting that the activities of these new religious groups could endanger the health, rights and freedoms of others. On account of the high value of the legal interests to be protected, this suspicion had been sufficient to justify the contested statements. The Government further maintained that they had used the mildest means at their disposal by restricting themselves to providing objective information – thus observing the principle of neutrality in religious matters – and had not in any way restricted the applicant associations’ activities. […].
The third party’s submissions
The Helsinki Foundation submitted that the labelling of religious groups as “sects” or “cults” was widespread in Poland and other European countries. They considered that the term “sect” had an unclear meaning and a clearly negative connotation and should be regarded as defamatory when used by public officials. Consequently, such labelling should be considered as indirect interference which could not be justified as it was not necessary in a democratic society.
Assessment by the Court
The Court reiterates at the outset that a Church or an ecclesiastical body may, as such, exercise on behalf of its adherents the rights guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention (see Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], no. 27417/95, § 72, ECHR 2000-VII). […] While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom to manifest one’s religion, alone and in private, or in community with others, in public and within the circle of those whose faith one shares. […] Nevertheless, Article 9 does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief (see, amongst many other authorities, Kalaç v. Turkey, judgment of 1 July 1997, Reports 1997-IV, p. 1209, § 27). […] According to their statutes, the applicant associations promote the teachings of Osho. They run Osho meditation centres, organise seminars, celebrate religious events and carry out joint work projects. According to the teachings of their community, the aim of spiritual development is enlightenment. […] The Court considers that these views can be considered as the manifestation of the applicant associations’ belief. Their complaints therefore fall within the ambit of Article 9 of the Convention. The Court must consider whether the applicant associations’ right under Article 9 was interfered with and, if so, whether the interference was “prescribed by law”, pursued a legitimate aim and was “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention.
Whether there was interference
The remaining applicant associations maintained that the information campaign and the expressions used to describe their movement demonstrated a failure by the Government to remain neutral in the exercise of their powers. The contested statements had had a negative impact on their reputation and the credibility of their teachings in society and reduced the number of their members. The Court notes that the measures taken by the Government did not amount to a prohibition of the applicant associations’ activities or those of their members. The applicant associations retained their freedom of religion, both as regards their freedom of conscience and the freedom to manifest their beliefs through worship and practice. However, the terms used to describe the applicant associations’ movement may have had negative consequences for them. Without ascertaining the exact extent and nature of such consequences, the Court proceeds on the assumption that the Government’s statements in issue constituted an interference with the applicant associations’ right to manifest their religion or belief, as guaranteed by Article 9 § 1 of the Convention.
Whether the interference was prescribed by law
The remaining applicant associations maintained that the Government’s information campaign had had no legal basis. […] The Court reiterates its settled case-law that the expression “prescribed by law” requires firstly that the impugned measure should have a basis in domestic law. It also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it be accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient precision to enable them – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail and to regulate their conduct (Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, § 64, ECHR 2004-I). Further, as regards the words “in accordance with the law” and “prescribed by law” which appear in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, the Court observes that it has always understood the term “law” in its “substantive” sense, not its “formal” one (De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12, p. 45, § 93). “Law” must be understood to include both statutory law and judge-made “law” (see, among other authorities, The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 30, § 47, and Casado Coca v. Spain, judgment of 24 February 1994, Series A no. 285-A, p. 18, § 43). In sum, the “law” is the provision in force as the competent courts have interpreted it. […] The Court notes that in its decision of 26 June 2002 the Federal Constitutional Court found that the legal basis of the interference under consideration was provided by the Basic Law. The duty of imparting information on subjects of public concern was one of the governmental tasks directly assigned by the Basic Law to the Government. The Court accepts that it can prove difficult to frame law with a high precision on matters such as providing information, where the relevant factors are in constant evolution in line with developments in society and in the means of communication, and tight regulation may not be appropriate. […] As to the applicant associations’ argument that the legislature had failed to enact adequate legal rules to protect them against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with their right to manifest their religion or belief, the Court observes that, according to the Federal Constitutional Court, the Basic Law did not grant an unfettered discretion to the Government when imparting information. Statements affecting the very essence of the right guaranteed by Article 4 §§ 1 and 2 of the Basic Law must be appropriate in relation to the cause for concern. The State had to observe neutrality in religious or philosophical matters and was forbidden from depicting a religious or philosophical group in a defamatory or distorted manner. Having regard to the above, the Court accepts that the interference with the applicant associations’ right to manifest their religion may be regarded as being “prescribed by law”.
Legitimate aim
The remaining applicant associations maintained that, in the absence of any attempt on their part to infringe the rights of others and in the absence of any such objective in their statutes, the restriction on the exercise of their right to manifest their religion or belief had not pursued any legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. The Court reiterates that States are entitled to verify whether a movement or association carries on, ostensibly in pursuit of religious aims, activities which are harmful to the population or to public safety (see Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 45701/99, § 113, ECHR 2001-XII). The Court observes that the purpose of the Government’s warnings was to provide information capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society on matters of major public concern at the relevant time and to draw attention to the dangers emanating from groups which were commonly referred to as sects. Considering also the terms in which the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court was phrased, the Court considers that the interference with the applicant associations’ right was in pursuit of legitimate aims under Article 9 § 2, namely the protection of public safety and public order and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
“Necessary in a democratic society”
The remaining applicant associations submitted that the statements in issue were not necessary in a democratic society. Applying the principles established in its case-law (as summarised in Leyla Şahin v. Turkey ([GC], no 44774/98), ECHR 2005-…, §§ 104-110), the Court has to weigh up the conflicting interests of the exercise of the right of the applicant associations to proper respect for their freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the duty of the national authorities to impart to the public information on matters of general concern. The Court notes in the first place that the Basic Law empowers the Government to collect and disseminate information of their own motion. […] The Government, in fulfilling the functions assumed by it, must take care that information is conveyed in a neutral manner when dealing with religious and philosophical convictions and is bound by the standards inherent in the proportionality principle. Even when circumscribed in this way, such information clearly cannot exclude on the part of the Government certain assessments capable of encroaching on the religious or philosophical sphere. […] The contested statements and the other material before the Court show that the German Government, by providing people in good time with explanations it considered useful at that time, was aiming to settle a burning public issue and attempting to warn citizens against phenomena it viewed as disturbing, for example, the appearance of numerous new religious movements and their attraction for young people. […] The Court takes the view that such a power of preventive intervention on the State’s part is also consistent with the Contracting Parties’ positive obligations under Article 1 of the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms of persons within their jurisdiction. Those obligations relate not only to any interference that may result from acts or omissions imputable to agents of the State or occurring in public establishments, but also to interference imputable to private individuals within non-State entities (see, mutatis mutandis, Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, § 49, ECHR 2002-I, and Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, § 103, ECHR 2003-II). An examination of the Government’s activity in dispute establishes further that it in no way amounted to a prohibition of the applicant associations’ freedom to manifest their religion or belief. The Court further observes that the Federal Constitutional Court, in its decision given on 26 June 2002, carefully analysed the impugned statements and prohibited the use of the adjectives “destructive” and “pseudo-religious” and the allegation that members of the movement were manipulated as infringing the principle of religious neutrality. The remaining terms, notably the naming of the applicant associations’ groups as “sects”, “youth sects” or “psycho-sects”, even if they had a pejorative note, were used at the material time quite indiscriminately for any kind of non-mainstream religion. The Court further notes that the Government undisputedly refrained from further using the term “sect” in their information campaign following the recommendation contained in the expert report on “so-called sects and psychocults” issued in 1998 (see paragraph 32, above). […] In the light of the foregoing and having regard to the margin of appreciation left to the national authorities, whose duty it is in a democratic society also to consider, within the limits of their jurisdiction, the interests of society as a whole, the Court finds that the interference in issue was justified in principle and proportionate to the aim pursued. There has accordingly been no violation of Article 9 of the Convention.
IV. Further alleged violations of the Convention
The applicant associations further complained that by defaming their religious community and embarking on a repressive campaign against them, the Government had subjected them to discriminatory treatment contrary to Article 9, taken together with Article 14 of the Convention. […] The applicant associations also relied on Article 10 of the Convention. […]. The Court notes that these complaints are linked to the one examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible. The Court notes that these complaints concern the same facts as the complaint under Article 9. Having regard to the finding relating to Article 9 the Court considers that they do not raise a separate issue under these provisions.
V. Application of article 41 of the Convention
Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
Damage
The first, second and third applicant associations claimed at least 30,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the disadvantages they allegedly suffered as a result of the Government’s statements. The Government did not express an opinion on the matter. The Court notes that, while the remaining applicant associations claimed compensation for the alleged violation of their right to freedom of religion, they have not claimed compensation for any non-pecuniary damage suffered because of the excessive length of the proceedings. Accordingly, the Court does not see fit to award the applicant associations any compensation under this head.
Costs and expenses
The first, second and third applicant associations also claimed EUR 13,810.86 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 16,926.57 for those incurred before the Court. They submitted documents in support of their claims. The Government did not express an opinion on the matter. According to the Court’s caselaw, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers that the applicant associations have not established that the costs and expenses claimed for the proceedings before the domestic courts were incurred by them in order to seek prevention or rectification of the specific violation caused by the excessive length of the proceedings. However, seeing that in length-of proceedings cases the protracted examination of a case beyond a “reasonable time” involves an increase in the applicant’s costs (see, among other authorities, Sürmeli v. Germany [GC], no. 75529/01, § 148, ECHR 2006), it does not find it unreasonable to make to the applicant associations, who were jointly represented by counsel, a joint award of EUR 1,500 under this head. With regard to the costs incurred in the proceedings before it, the Court, deciding in equity, jointly awards EUR 2,500.
Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Decides unanimously to strike out the application in so far as it concerns the complaints of the fourth and fifth applicant associations (Dharmadeep Verein für ganzheitliches Leben e.V. and Osho Meditations Center Berlin e.V);
Declares unanimously the remainder of the application admissible;
Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds by five votes to two that there has been no violation of Article 9 of the Convention;
Holds unanimously that no separate issue arises under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9 and Article 10 of the Convention;
Holds unanimously
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the first, second and third applicant associations, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, in respect of costs and expenses; (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicant associations’ claim for just satisfaction.

As seen these two cases show different outcomes, and were important steps for the evolution of jurisprudence regarding religious human rights.

On the evolution of Religion in Europe: a case law study on new religions, ancient spirituality and unexpected philosophies (Part II)